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Abstract: This paper explores the impact of industrialisation and urbanisation on financial 
development by incorporating the role of institutional quality for India and China over the period 
of 1970-2013. We apply the bounds testing approach, which accommodates structural breaks, in 
order to test the presence of cointegration between the variables. The results show the existence 
of long-run dynamics between the series. Furthermore, we establish that industrialisation and 
urbanisation lead to financial development and that the lack of institutional quality and 
government size reduces financial development. Trade openness enhances Indian financial 
development but hinders Chinese financial development. The causality analysis depicts the 
bidirectional causality between urbanisation (industrialisation) and financial development for 
India. In the case of China, the urbanisation Granger causes financial development, and the 
feedback effect exists between industrialisation and financial development. Institutional quality 
is found to be the core factor in enhancing financial development in both countries with a 
feedback effect. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last three decades, both developed and developing countries have modernised their 
financial systems; India and China are no exception. In both countries, financial systems have 
become much deeper by following broad-based standard measures. The financial system in India 
has evolved from being constricted and undersized to becoming more open, deregulated and 
market-oriented after undergoing a number of policy changes. Since the 1960s, government 
control has increased, and allocating credit has become common in the pursuit of development 
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programmes. Nationalisation of the 14 largest commercial banks was initiated in 1969. The late 
1980s were marked as the start of the gradual liberalisation of the financial system. In 1991, the 
Indian government initiated a comprehensive market-oriented program, the core of which was a 
phased deregulation of the financial sector, along with reforms of trade and industrial policies. 
The broad indicators of financial development showed an upward trend in the1990s, after the 
implementation of financial sector liberalisation programmes. Among the key changes were the 
relaxation of quantitative controls, the deregulation of the interest rate structure, the introduction 
of new money market instruments, and the overall reform within the banking system, money and 
capital markets.  
Since economic liberalisation in late 1970s, China has grown more than twenty-fold in 
real terms, while the Indian economy has expanded 6.5 times between 1978 and 2011. Financial 
development opened up foreign direct investment (FDI), increased banking participation, and 
expanded the stock equity and the bond markets of these two countries. For example, stock 
market capitalisation increased from 4% to 80% of the GDP for China between 1992 and 2010; 
for India, it increased from 22% to 95% of the GDP. In China, the size of the banking system 
measured in terms of total bank credit to non-state sectors is 116% of the GDP over 2001-2007, 
while this figure is only 37% for India (Allen et al. 2012). Expansion of private sector financing 
has taken place, particularly after the reform periods.1 
China’s banking system is dominated by the four largest state-owned banks.2 The level of 
non-performing loans over GDP has declined over the years after its peak during 2000-2001. The 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were established in 
1990, which mostly remain speculative and are led by insider trading. Alternative financing 
channels such as informal financial intermediaries, internal financing and trade credits play a 
significant role through the ‘Hybrid Sector’, a major source of growth in China.3 In this respect, 
the role of the state and listed sectors is less dominant in influencing the growth of the economy. 
China’s inclusion in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 accelerated the integration of 
the economy with the rest of the world. Total investment in the real estate sector was 
approximately $3.12 trillion in 2007, which was the same size as the stock market (Allen et al. 
                                                          
1Didier and Schmukler (2013) 
2The Bank of China (BOC), the People’s Construction Bank of China (PCBC), the Agriculture Bank of China 
(ABC), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). 
3
He et al. (2014) 
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2012). Since 1998, the real estate market has grown significantly due to changes in housing 
assistance by government companies, development of an individual mortgage system, and rising 
rural-urban migration due to urbanisation and industrialisation. Overall, China’s economic 
growth is fuelled by non-standard financial sectors that are dominated by trust, reputation and 
friendships compared to Western-style legal institutions, such as banking and non-banking 
financial institutions. 
Sankhe et al. (2011) emphasise that the Indian urban population will be driven by the 
young population in the future and therefore needs to optimise the productivity and GDP 
potential of its cities. According to the 2011 census, the urban population increased from 286 
million to 377 million between 2001 and 2011.  
An increasing urban population with young workers could be a source of ‘demographic 
dividends’ in the future for India. It is therefore critical that India remove barriers in the financial 
and other sectors in creating growth and development for its massive urbanisation and younger 
population. 
China is urbanising at an accelerating rate. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, 
the population was 1.34 billion in 2010, with 50 percent living in cities. Rapid urbanisation is a 
product of China’s transition to a market economy. Urbanisation began in a difficult fiscal 
environment that worsened through the first two decades of reform. Financial mechanisms and 
strategies for Chinese municipalities were well managed in this environment. Despite the 
inauspicious start, China’s spectacular economic growth performance over this period appears to 
provide prima facie evidence that the government has managed the urbanisation process 
sufficiently.  
This paper raises a significant research question as to whether industrialisation and 
urbanisation induced financial development of these two global economic powers. In exploring 
this, we analyse the impact of industrialisation and urbanisation on financial development by 
incorporating the role of institutional quality for both economies over the period of 1970-2013.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no single study in the literature that primarily 
covers the dynamic linkages between these indicators in explaining financial development 
covering the longest available time period. In doing so, we have employed the bounds testing 
approach of Pesaran et al. (2001) and accommodated structural breaks in order to test the 
presence of cointegration between the variables for both countries. The dynamic relationships are 
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obtained using the variance decomposition techniques in a vector autoregressive (VAR) 
framework. Finally, impulse response functions are computed in order to examine the dynamic 
properties of the system beyond the sample period for forecasting purposes.  
For both countries, we establish the existence of cointegration between the series. 
Furthermore, urbanisation and industrialisation lead to financial development, and the lack of 
institutional quality and government size reduces financial development. Trade openness 
increases Indian financial development but reduces Chinese financial development. The causality 
analysis depicts the bidirectional causality between urbanisation (industrialisation) and financial 
development in India. For China, the urbanisation Granger causes financial development, and the 
feedback effect exists between industrialisation and financial development. Institutional quality 
causes financial development and in return, financial development causes institutional quality. 
This study offers some policy implications at the aggregate level. Our findings suggest that 
finance is important for both countries and that financial development is integrated with trade, 
urbanisation and industrialisation. The role of the government and institutions are significant in 
this respect. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature. Section 3 describes the model, data and the proxy measures of financial development 
and other variables. Section 4 presents the empirical findings with a discussion. In the final 
section, we compare the major findings for both countries and highlight some policy implications. 
 
2. Brief Overview of the Literature 
The seminal research by Schumpeter (1911) sparked a voluminous amount of research in the 
finance-growth nexus. Early studies by Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and others have indicated financial development as the engine of 
long-term economic growth4. Urbanisation and industrialisation require access to domestic and 
foreign capital and a developed financial market. Having a developed financial system in an 
economy also helps with the saving and investment decisions of individuals and firms. 
Government policies and legislation that require greater information disclosure can help in 
making investment decisions. We relate different key indicators of our study with financial 
development here. 
                                                          
4
Levine (2005) presents a survey of this literature; see Ogawa (2015) for a recent review. 
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2.1. Urbanisation, Industrialisation and Financial Development 
Urbanisation is a major demographic trend for both China and India, with potentially major 
consequences for financial development. Over the past few decades, dramatic growth and 
structural changes have taken place in both economies. Massive foreign direct investment has 
accelerated the urbanisation of both countries. Yao-jun (2005) describes the relationship between 
Chinese financial development and urbanisation growth. In the Indian context, Kundu (2013) 
presents the urbanisation process as relating to different aspects of development, including the 
financial sector. 
2.2. Institutions, Government and Financial Development 
The workings of political institutions shape political actors’ incentives to provide financial 
development. On the one hand, interest groups may be obstacles for financial development. 
Rajan and Zingales (2003) suggest that financial development may foster competition by 
allowing credit-constrained firms to enter the market. This may create a political constituency 
against financial development by incumbents. The incentives and strength of interest groups to 
fend off financial development will be lower with greater trade openness and access to finance.  
On the other hand, following Haber et al. (2003), the government may limit financial 
development, regardless of the structure of the interest groups in the society. Government 
officials may prefer to maintain a lax financial institutional environment. Governments would be 
less inclined to ’play the system’ to the extent that fiscal and financial management capacities are 
greater. Governments and international organisations should be very proactive in supporting 
sectors that are highly credit dependent. Demetriades and Rousseau (2011) suggest that 
government expenditure has a positive effect on the financial development of countries that are 
in the middle range of economic development, with a strong negative effect on rich countries and 
an insignificant effect on poor countries. The lack of government expenditure may affect poor 
countries due to insufficient infrastructure or property rights in an effectively functioning 
financial system.  
On the other hand, large government size may hurt high-income countries with the 
crowding-out effect. Becerra et al. (2012) emphasise the role of the government in shaping the 
financial system. For economies with a limited capacity to tax at the state level, government 
officials are more inclined to abuse the system by directing resources towards their own 
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functioning. This may cause an increase in the cost of private capital and create a barrier to 
financial activities. 
Legal origin, legal rules and the quality of law enforcement can be a major strength of broad 
financial markets as suggested by La Porta et al. (1997) and Beck et al. (2002). Other factors that 
reflect the willingness and ability to protect individual property rights and indicators of the 
political environment as suggested by Barro and Lee (1994) and Bordo and Rousseau (2012), 
may also influence financial development. Campos et al. (2012) report that the financial system 
has a positive effect on economic growth in the long run. They state that political instability in 
Argentina may affect short run findings. 
 
2.3. Trade Openness and Financial Development 
Possible linkages between finance and trade openness open further channels through which the 
financial and real sectors may interact. A developed financial system may be a source of 
comparative advantage for industrialisation in accessing external finance, as suggested by Beck 
(2002). Therefore, financial development goes hand in hand with trade openness and 
industrialisation. On the other hand, trade openness may be associated with the emergence of 
new financial products in the market. Therefore, financial institutions may be engaged in risk 
diversification as suggested by Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002). Baltagiet al. (2009) report trade 
openness as a key determinant for banking sector development. A recent study by Menyah et al. 
(2014) establishes a unidirectional causality running from financial development to trade 
openness in the case of Burundi, Malawi, Niger, Senegal and Sudan. Trade openness causes 
financial development in Gabon only.  
Despite this voluminous literature on the development of financial markets and growth, 
rigorous studies that link financial market development with other variables in the real sector are 
sparse, particularly from the developing world. Demand (viz. industrialisation, urbanisation and 
trade openness) and supply side factors (viz. legal, political and institutional structures) play a 
significant role. Most studies in the literature are based on either heterogeneous countries or a 
stand-alone country. In retrospect, our research is motivated by three factors. First, as discussed 
above, both China and India have reformed their economic and financial systems to improve the 
efficiency of financial institutions in achieving higher economic growth since the 1980s. We 
trace here the time series properties of financial development over four decades for these two 
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countries, which have similarities in many aspects of development. Second, we establish long-
run dynamics between urbanisation, industrialisation, the role of institutions and trade openness 
with financial development. Third, our multivariate framework of the model with a similar time 
frame establishes the direction, structural break and strength of the causal link between the real 
and financial sectors.  
 
3. Model and Data 
It is often believed in economic theory that before carrying out any empirical exercise, an 
effective discussion of the theoretical setup linking the causal relationship between urbanisation, 
industrialisation, institutional quality and financial development in any emerging economy 
deserves valuable consideration from the viewpoints of wide readership and contributes to 
conceptual clarity. Given the absence of the theoretical discussion, the rest of the empirical 
analysis is assumed to be meaningless in the field of empirical literature. Therefore, we proceed 
to analyse the underlying theoretical issues that bind together the empirical framework for 
emerging economies such as India and China. Both industrialisation and urbanisation are 
expected to induce the financial development of an economy in the sense that growing 
industrialisation attracts the migration of labour to the process of production. Therefore, the 
increasing production process of the new emerging economy requires more financial resources to 
fund existing business in the form of purchasing raw materials and paying wages to labour 
because both capital and labour are being used as potential inputs in the expansion of industrial 
activities. This indicates that the development of the financial system is positively linked with 
the industrialisation process of an economy.  
Urbanisation may positively affect economic growth and financial development in an 
economy. An increase in urbanisation in the search for job and living opportunities requires 
some amount of financial assistance from formal (e.g., banking sector) and informal (e.g., 
microfinance) institutions for the day-to-day survival of migrants. This further indicates that 
although people earn wages from their employment in industrial sectors, their wages are unable 
to support them beyond the subsistence level of consumption and, hence, greater financial 
development is necessary for industrial labour in order to accommodate their long-term 
investments in the housing and education sectors.  
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However, institutional quality plays a vital role in enhancing the financial development of 
an economy (Law et al. 2015). In this regard, Mishkin (2009), in a theory-based paper, argues 
that institutional quality is expected to play a propelling role in fostering the financial 
development of an economy through the globalisation channel, further indicating that 
globalisation is one source of financial development for developing or emerging economies. It 
can be seen that most developing countries are found to be poor in terms of not having well-
established financial development.5In order to have a developed financial system, Mishkin (2009) 
suggests that developing countries need to open their economies to the rest of the world. This 
results in an improvement in the quality of domestic financial institutions and the maintenance of 
a strong financial infrastructure (e.g., effective property rights, effective legal systems, less 
corruption, higher degree of corporate governance and sound financial regulations).  
Maintaining a strong financial infrastructure is ideally possible only if an economy is 
open to the rest of the world, particularly in finance and trade. For instance, opening domestic 
markets to foreign financial institutions promotes reforms to the financial system that improves 
its smooth functioning and channels resources to the most efficient investment avenues. 
Eventually, competition continues to increase between domestic and foreign financial institutions 
and creates logistical pressure for the governments of developing countries to initiate financial 
sector reform for the improvement of domestic financial institutions as well as for economic 
growth and development. This is because domestic financial institutions are unable to compete 
with foreign banking institutions because of their familiarity with advanced financial systems, 
best practices and well-maintained financial infrastructure. This also shows that domestic 
financial institutions need to account for well-developed financial infrastructure that will lead to 
further financial development. Following the existing literature and theoretical setup, the 
empirical equation is modelled as follows: 
 
itttttt OGSIUF   lnlnlnlnlnln 654321   (1) 
 
                                                          
5
Fase and Abma (2003) find that financial development is a significant factor for growth and development in 
Southeast Asian economies. Moreover, Hsueh et al. (2013) also recently established that financial development 
leads to economic growth in Asian economies. For a discussion on the significance of financial development on 
economic growth, see Levin (2003) and Ang (2008).   
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where tF is real domestic credit to the private sector for per capita proxy for financial 
development;6 tU is the urban population measure for urbanisation; tI  is the real industrial value-
added per capita proxy for industrialisation; tS is the measure of the institutional quality index 
based on Corruption, Rule of Law, Bureaucratic Quality, Government Repudiation of Contracts 
and Risk of Expropriation; tG is real government consumption per capita; tO  is real trade per 
capita; and i is the normally distributed error term. We have transformed all the series into 
natural logarithms. 
We have used annual data for an empirical analysis for the period 1970-2013. The data 
on real GDP (US$), real industry value added (US$), real domestic credit to the private sector, 
real government spending (US$), real trade (US$) and urban population are from the World 
Development Indicators (CD-ROM, 2014) series published by the World Bank. The data on total 
population are also from the same source and are used to transform the variables into per capita 
units. The data on institutional quality are obtained from the Freedom House.7 
The existing applied economics literature provides numerous approaches to examining 
whether cointegration exists between the variables. These approaches include the Engle-Granger 
(1987) residual-based bivariate cointegration test, bivariate and multivariate maximum likelihood, 
the Johansen and Juselius (1990) approach, and the fully modified ordinary least square 
method(FMOLS) developed by Philips and Hansen (1990). Stock and Watson (1993) developed 
the dynamic ordinary least squares (OLS), i.e., leads and lags dynamics have been employed to 
investigate the long-run linkages between the variables. These cointegration tests are not suitable 
for small data sets with mixed orders of integration of the variables (Shahbaz et al. 2015). This 
indicates that biased empirical evidence from a financial development analysis misleads us in 
formulating appropriate economic policies for sustainable financial development by using 
industrialisation and urbanisation as economic tools. To overcome this issue, we have chosen the 
                                                          
6
There are many indicators for financial development in the literature. Khan and Senhadji (2003) use the ratio of M2 
money stock to GDP as a proxy for the volume of the financial sector and the level of monetization. M3 money 
stock, as a share of GDP, captures the volume of liquid liabilities in the financial sector. In other studies, the ratio of 
commercial bank assets to total assets (held by commercial and central banks) is considered a proxy for the relative 
importance of commercial banks within the financial sector (Rioja and Valev, 2004). Ang and McKibbin (2007) 
prefer the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector as a measure of financial development. This measure 
excludesthe credit issued by the central bank to the government. Domestic credit to the private sector allows 
commercial banks to allocate savings for profitable investment within an economy. 
7House (2013).  
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bounds testing approach (autoregressive distributed lag modelling) developed by Pesaran et al. 
(2001) to test the cointegration amid the series. We have used the unrestricted error correction 
(UECM) version of the bounds testing approach to cointegration, and UECM is modelled as 
follows: 
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where,   is the difference terms; i , i =2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 show the long-run relationship; s , s =1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6 are short-run dynamics; and i is the error term. This approach tests the presence of 
cointegration if the variables have a mixed order of integration or the variables are integrated at 
the level, i.e., I(0), or at 1st difference, i.e., I(1). For this purpose, we compute the ARDL F-
statistic by using the joint significance of the lagged level estimates. Using equation 2 where 
tFln (financial development) are dependent variables, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is
0: 765432  nH , and the alternative hypothesis of cointegration is
0: 765432  aH . The null hypothesis may be accepted if cointegration is absent. We 
replace the dependent variable explanatory variables to test whether cointegration is present amid 
the series, following Shahbaz et al. (2015). The F-statistic can also be computed by the following 
empirical models, i.e., ),,,,/( ttttttF OGSIUFF , ),,,,/( ttttttU OGSIFUF , ),,,,/( ttttttI OGSUFIF , 
),,,,/( tttttS OGIUFSF , ),,,,/( ttttttG OSIUFGF and ),,,,/( ttttttO GSIUFOF . We compare our computed F-
statistic with the critical bounds to decide whether cointegration exists amid the series. The upper 
and lower critical bounds developed by Pesaran et al. (2001) have a non-standard distribution 
and are not suitable for small sizes. Narayan (2005) provided critical bounds ranging from 30-80 
observations at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels with various lag lengths. We compare 
our computed ARDL F-statistic with Narayan’s (2005) upper and lower critical bounds. We 
compare our F-statistic with the lower critical bound once all the variables are integrated at the 
level or first difference. We can reject the hypothesis of no cointegration when our computed F-
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statistic is greater than the lower critical bound or vice versa. We use the upper critical bound if 
all the variables are integrated at 1st difference, i.e. I(1) or I(0)/I(1). In such a case, we may 
conclude that cointegration is present between the variables if the upper critical bound is less 
than the computed F-statistic. If the computed ARDL F-statistic falls between the upper and 
lower critical bounds, then the decision about cointegration is questionable. Finally, we apply the 
CUSUM and CUSUMsq tests to verify the stability of the estimates of the bounds testing 
approach.8 We investigate the direction of the causal relationship between financial development, 
urbanisation, industrialisation, government size, institutional quality and trade openness by 
applying the vector error correction (VECM) method Granger causality approach.9 
 
4. Empirical Findings and Discussions 
It is well known in the classical econometric literature that estimated results appear to be biased 
without testing the integrating properties of the variables. It is often argued that the use of 
stationary variables in the cointegrating equation will tend to produce spurious or meaningless 
results. To be free from spurious results, it is important to use the level series in the estimation of 
cointegration techniques, which requires the level series to be integrated in the order of the I(1) 
process.  
To examine the integrating properties of the variables, we have employed the Ng-Perron 
(NP) unit root test. From Table-1, the Ng-Perron unit root test indicates that all variables 
(financial development, urbanisation, industrialisation, institutional quality, government size, and 
trade openness) are non-stationary at the levels and are also found to be stationary after first 
differencing for India and China. Although the Ng-Perron unit root appears to be the standard 
test compared to other conventional unit root tests (ADF and PP), this may produce inefficient 
findings due to its low explanatory power as well as not considering relevant information about 
structural break(s) in the series.  
 
Insert Table1 here please 
To overcome this problem, we have applied the Zevot-Andrews (ZA, 1992) unit root test. 
The ZA single structural break unit root test results for India and China are shown in Table2. The 
                                                          
8
We also employ diagnostic tests to examine the presence of the normality of the residual term, serial correlation, 
ARCH, white heteroscedasticity and specification of functional form of the empirical model. 
9
Theoretical details are explained in Shahbaz et al. (2015). 
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results are non-stationary for both countries at the level series of financial development, 
urbanisation, industrialisation, institutional quality, and government size and trade openness with 
structural breaks. The break years for India are between 1981 and 2005, while for China, the 
years are between 1984 and 2005. Both countries have experienced significant economic, 
financial and trade reform during this period. This indicates that both India and China have 
improved their growth status by implementing various economic, financial and trade reforms in 
the areas of the financial sector, urbanisation, industrial activity, and institutional quality. 
Moreover, both economies reflect successful growth and reform policies through effective 
government spending and size expansion. From these perspectives, it is strongly argued that both 
economies grow at the same intensity due to the similar characteristics in the population, fertile 
demographic trend, and greater role by the government. Considering this scenario, the results 
further show that all level series are found to be stationary and significant after first differencing, 
indicating the potential advantage of the ZA unit root test over the NP test. 
 
Insert Table 2 here please 
 
The ARDL bounds testing approach is known to be sensitive to lag length selection and, 
therefore, we have employed the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) to determine an appropriate 
lag length. The advantage of using AIC is that AIC has super power properties for small sample 
data compared to other traditional lag length criteria, such as the final prediction error (FPE), 
Schwarz information criteria (SIC), and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) information criteria (Lutkephol, 
2006). We find the optimum lag length for both economies (India and China) are decided by AIC 
as shown in column2 of Table-3. We have also estimated ARDL-F statistics in order to show 
whether cointegration is present among the variables.  
The results reported in column-4 of Table-3 for India show that our computed F-statistic 
exceeds the upper bound at the 5% level of significance when we use financial development, 
urbanisation and industrialisation as dependent variables. The results further reveal that our 
computed F-statistic surpasses the upper bound at the 1% level of significance when using 
institutional quality as the dependent variable. This confirms the presence of four cointegrating 
vectors and cointegration among the variables over the period of 1970-2013.  
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Insert Table 3 here please 
 
Similarly for China, our computed F-statistic exceeds the upper bound at the 5% level of 
significance when we use financial development and government size as dependent variables. On 
the other hand, the computed F-statistic surpasses the upper bound at the 1% level of significance 
when we employ institutional quality and trade openness as dependent variables. These results 
also confirm the presence of four cointegrating vectors and, hence, cointegration between the 
variables for China over the period of 1970-2013.  
The ARDL bounds testing model has passed the test of normality, ARCH, Reset and 
serial correlation. This indicates the absence of non-normality, autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity, specification and serial correlation.    
The presence of cointegration among the variables enables us to examine the impacts of 
urbanisation, industrialisation, institutional quality, government size and trade openness on 
financial development in the long run for India and China. The long run results for India and 
China are presented in Table-4 with the help of various long-run conventional and dynamic OLS 
techniques. From an empirical perspective, we find that financial development is statistically 
significant and positively linked with urbanisation, industrialisation, and trade openness while 
being statistically significant and adversely linked with institutional quality and government size 
at the 1% and 5% levels of significance across various models for India. Urbanisation adds 
financial development in the long run for India, indicating that the higher the level of 
urbanisation is, the greater the demand is for financial services, ultimately leading to financial 
development in the Indian economy.  
 
Insert Table 4 here please 
 
Similarly, the positive financial development effect of industrialisation is found for India, 
which reveals that a rise in industrial activity requires more financial capital to fund investment 
and thereby enables the financial sector to grow in order to mitigate the financial services of 
business firms in industrial activity. A similar positive long-run relationship between financial 
development and trade openness is also found for India, suggesting that greater trade openness 
has the capacity to encourage the domestic economy to attract more foreign investors in 
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investing their financial capital in long-term projects. In this way, the domestic financial sector in 
an emerging economy such as India has a higher probability of being developed due to exposure 
to foreign technology and managerial skills as well as access to their large inflows of financial 
capital. Surprisingly, we also find that neither institutional quality nor government size improves 
financial development for the Indian economy in the long run. This indicates that although the 
Indian economy has benefited from trade liberalisation, the lack of governance and quality 
government intervention, increasing corruption and stringent government restrictions are 
responsible for lower financial development in India. Government size does not improve long-
run financial development in India. This indicates that the benefits of increasing the government 
consumption expenditure does not extend to financial development because the government 
expenditure being spent may benefit the elite rather than the society at large. In other words, 
fiscal spending by the government may have increased various branches of the banking sector in 
urban areas but not the rural areas as expected. Such a situation may be responsible for the 
adverse consequence of government size on financial development for India in the long run. 
Table-4 shows long-run results for China, indicating that financial development is 
statistically significant and positively linked with urbanisation and industrialisation at the 1% 
level of significance across various models. Similarly for China, financial development is also 
statistically significant and adversely linked with institutional quality, government size and trade 
openness at the 1% and 5% levels of significance across various models. We empirically 
conclude that both urbanisation and industrialisation improve financial development in the long 
run. This indicates that the greater rate of migration taking place from rural to urban areas is 
leading to a rise in the urban population growth in China, thereby pushing many people into 
urban areas where they open bank accounts in order to access financial services from the banking 
industry. As a result, an increasing demand for the banking industry in the urban areas of China 
may be responsible for financial development in the long run. Industrialisation improves 
financial development in the Chinese economy in the long run, reflecting that both urbanisation 
and industrialisation are believed to be highly correlated in the remit of economic theory. This is 
because increasing urbanisation induces higher industrialisation activity because industry 
primarily necessitates labour as an input in the process of intermediate and final production of 
commodities, and ultimately, commodities are demanded by the labour that is engaged in the 
industrial activities. Business firms in the commodity industry need more financial capital from 
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the banking industry in order to fund their investment activities, which are necessary for the 
process of production. In this way, we believe that industrialisation improves financial 
development for China in the long run. More interestingly, we also find that for China, trade 
openness, institutional quality and government size impede financial development in the long 
run.10 This shows that the Chinese government needs to improve the institutional quality, create a 
favourable environment for exports and imports, and expand the productivity driven government 
size for the greater benefit of financial development in the long run. 
Table-5 shows the short-run results for India and China. For India, we find that financial 
development is statistically and positively linked with urbanisation and industrialisation in the 
short run. This finding is similar to the long-run result for India. No significant relationships 
between financial development, institutional quality, and government size and trade openness are 
found in the short run for India. Similarly for China, we find that financial development is 
statistically significant and positively linked with industrialisation in the short run, indicating that 
industrialisation also adds financial development in the short run. More interestingly, we also 
find that institutional quality and government size hinder financial development in the short run 
because the relationships between financial development, institutional quality and government 
size are inversely related in the statistical sense. The significance of the lagged error term, i.e.,
1tECM , corroborates long-run relationships between financial development and other macro 
variables for India and China. The estimate of the lagged error term, i.e., 1tECM , is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level for both economies. This indicates that short-
run deviations are corrected by 39% for India and 67% for China every year towards a long-run 
equilibrium path. The results of the diagnostic tests are also reported in the lower segment of 
Table6. We find that the normality of the residual term is confirmed by the Jarque-Bera test. We 
also find that there is no evidence of serial correlation and that the absence of the ARCH effect is 
confirmed. The empirical evidence validates the absence of white noise heteroscedasticity, and 
the functional form of the model is well established. As far as the stability segment is concerned 
for empirical estimation, we have employed a short-run and long-run stability function, which is 
investigated by applying the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares 
                                                          
10
Most studies from China find a negative association between financial development and growth; Zhang et al. 
(2012) is an example of a recent survey. They report a positive association between financial development and 
growth with city-level data after China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
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(CUSUMsq) tests for India and China, as shown in the lower segment of Table5. The results of 
CUSUM and CUSUMsq are also reported for both economies in Figures 1 to 4. Figures 1 to 6 
ensure the stability of short-run and long-run coefficients for India and China because the 
CUSUM and CUSUMsqgraphs lie between the critical bounds at the 5% level of significance.  
Insert Table 5 here please 
Insert Figures 1 to 4here please 
 
The results of the vector error correction model (VECM) Granger causality are presented 
for India and China in Table-6. We surmise that, in the long run, urbanisation, industrialisation 
and institutional quality Granger cause financial development for India. The unidirectional 
causality is found from financial development to urbanisation in the short run. In the short run, a 
unidirectional Granger causality runs from urbanisation and industrialisation to institutional 
quality, while industrialisation causes trade openness in the Granger sense. Similarly for China, 
we note that in the long run, industrialisation, institutional quality, government size and trade 
openness Granger cause financial development. We find the short-run effect of financial 
development on institutional quality, government size and trade openness in the Granger sense. 
We also note that in the short run, industrialisation Granger causes financial development, 
institutional quality and trade openness, indicating that a unidirectional causality runs from 
industrialisation to financial development, institutional quality and trade openness. Bidirectional 
causality between institutional causality and trade openness exists in the short run. Unidirectional 
causality from government size to urbanisation also exists in the short run. The bidirectional 
Granger causality is found between government size and trade openness for China in the short 
run. In the Granger sense, trade openness also causes urbanisation in the short run. 
 
Insert Table 6 here please 
 
 
We conduct the VECM analysis by analysing the direction of the causal relationship 
between the series in both the short and long runs. This causal technique does not provide the 
information that is necessary for building policy implications because it does not accommodate 
any innovation or negative shocks occurring into the system. In this regard, we have applied the 
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generalised variance decomposition approach, which provides additional information in case any 
potential innovations or negative shocks that occur in the system are due to changes in one 
variable. The results of the variance decomposition technique are presented for India and China 
in Tables-7 and8. The variance decomposition analysis for India, as shown in Table8, indicates 
that innovative shocks occur in urbanisation, industrialisation, institutional quality, government 
size and trade openness, which explains financial development by 19.68%, 18.99%, 1.82%, 0.30% 
and 27.91%, respectively, when we proceed to 15 time periods. A 31.28% of variation in 
financial development is primarily explained by its innovative shock of 15 time periods. From 
this evidence, we find that the percentage variation of financial development used as a dependent 
variable is largely explained by urbanisation, industrialisation and trade openness, apart from its 
own innovative shock, which indicates that urbanisation, industrialisation and trade openness 
play a vital role in the dynamics of the financial sector development in the Indian economy. This 
finding is consistent with the result of the long-run analysis of this study as shown in Table4. As 
far as the role of urbanisation is concerned in the dynamics of financial development over 15 
time periods, financial development contributes to urbanisation by 35.26%. Industrialisation 
contributes to urbanisation by 12.26%. The innovative shocks occurring in institutional quality 
and government size minimally contribute to urbanisation by 0.94% and 0.27%, respectively. We 
also find that a shock occurring in trade openness largely contributes to urbanisation by 19.89%. 
Furthermore, the dynamics of both industrialisation and trade openness are contributed by the 
shock of financial development by 21.94% and 15.64%, respectively, followed by its innovative 
shocks of 39.81% and 24.57%, respectively. Apart from its shock explaining a larger variation of 
58.70%, financial development minimally contributes to institutional quality by 2.56%. 
Moreover, financial development contributes to the dynamics of government size by 19.45%, 
aside from its own shock, which influences it by 20.19%.  
 
Insert Tables-7 and 8 here please 
 
The results of the variance decomposition analysis for China are also reported in Table8. 
We find that apart from its own shock explaining by 66.28% over 15 time periods, urbanisation, 
industrialisation, institutional quality, government size, and trade openness contribute to 
financial development by 23.04%, 1.17%, 2.93%, 1.00% and 5.54%, respectively. This further 
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indicates the greater role of urbanisation in the dynamics of financial development in China, 
which is also evident in the long-run analysis shown in Table-5. As far as urbanisation is 
concerned in the long-run dynamics of financial development, the variance decomposition 
analysis also indicates that financial development contributes to urbanisation in China by 44.28% 
despite the shock explaining the urbanisation by 54.08%. Similarly, industrialisation, 
institutional quality, government size, and trade openness minimally contribute to urbanisation 
by 0.52%, 0.21%, 0.35% and 0.54%, respectively. Financial development, urbanisation, 
industrialisation, government size and trade openness also contribute to institutional quality by 
36.36%, 9.65%, 2.34%, 2.24% and 13.27%, respectively. We also find that financial 
development, urbanisation, industrialisation, institutional quality and trade openness affect the 
dynamics of government size by 69.69%, 23.92%, 1.08%, 0.99% and 1.13%, respectively. 
Finally, we find the contributions of financial development, urbanisation, industrialisation, 
institutional quality and government size on the dynamics of trade openness in China by 16.44%, 
56.36%, 5.92%, 5.57% and 0.79%, respectively.  
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications  
No previous comparative study examines the empirical dimension of understanding the 
determinants of financial development in emerging economies such as India and China. We 
address this gap in the literature here.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to offer an empirical examination 
exploring the impact of industrialisation and urbanisation on financial development by 
incorporating institutional quality using time series data for Indian and Chinese economies over 
the period of 1970-2013. In doing so, we have applied the bounds-testing approach developed by 
Pesaran et al. (2001) and accommodated efficient results and structural breaks in order to test the 
presence of long-run cointegration between the variables. The results show the existence of 
cointegration between the series.  
Furthermore, we find that urbanisation and industrialisation lead to financial development, 
while institutional quality and government size cause a decline in financial development in India 
and China. Trade openness increases Indian financial development but decreases Chinese 
financial development. The causality analysis depicts the bidirectional causality of urbanisation 
(industrialisation) and financial development in India. For China, urbanisation Granger causes 
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financial development, and the feedback effect exists between industrialisation and financial 
development. The relationship between institutional quality and financial development is 
bidirectional. 
We establish that institutional quality and government size impede financial development 
in the long run. This finding is not consistent with the seminal theoretical argument of Mishkin 
(2009), where he argued that better institutional quality in the presence of globalisation and 
higher government size improves financial development in developing economies, especially in 
the long run. This seminal theoretical argument proposed by Mishkin lacks a potential basis 
existence when we tested it empirically in the Indian and Chinese economies. From this 
perspective, we argue that Indian and Chinese governments and policy makers need to place 
greater importance on improving institutional quality and maintaining an ideal government size 
in order to realise better financial development in the long run.  
Interestingly, we also find that trade openness improves financial development in India 
and decreases Chinese financial development in the long run, which bears significant policy 
implications for China. In this sense, we argue that both policy makers and the government in 
China need to enhance the financial development capacity of trade openness, given the 
increasing size of the economy.  
Unless the Chinese government improves their financial sector, it will disturb the normal 
functioning of the financial market because the underdeveloped financial sector will not be able 
to accommodate the increasing demand for financial services, which has resulted primarily from 
the larger population of the society. In this context, it is also believed that the reduced 
availability of financial services will hamper investment activity in the economy; therefore it will 
decrease growth and development in the Chinese economy.  
Overall, in summary, it is theoretically argued by Mishkin that financial development is 
extremely important to the developmental aspect of any developing economy. Considering this 
fact, we establish here that both Indian and Chinese economies should be proactive in promoting 
financial development in the long run by promoting better institutional quality and effective 
government interventions within the economy. 
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Table-1: Ng-Perron Unit Root Test 
Variable     MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT 
India 
tFln  -5.48744 (2) -1.5666 0.2854 16.3492 
tUln  -13.9607 (1) -2.6338 0.1886 6.5743 
tIln  -3.84817 (2) -1.2953 0.3366 22.4635 
tSln  -12.4633 (1) -2.4887 0.1996 7.3528 
tGln  -13.4106 (1) -2.4812 0.1850 7.3983 
tOln  -5.31936 (2) -1.5430 0.2900 16.8206 
tFln  -19.9821 (2)** -3.1478 0.1575 4.6393 
tUln  -37.7757 (4)* -4.3300 0.1146 2.4985 
tIln  -47.7759 (3)* -4.7960 0.1003 2.3616 
tSln  -29.2592 (2)* -3.8248 0.1307 3.1146 
tGln  -29.7767 (3)* -3.8530 0.1294 3.0916 
tOln  -18.2937 (3)** -2.9586 0.1617 5.3761 
China 
tFln  -6.3133 (1) -1.7591 0.2786 14.428 
tUln  -4.7118 (2) -1.4982 0.3179 19.0960 
tIln  -7.1131 (1) -1.8642 0.2620 12.8418 
tSln  -12.4422 (3) -2.4933 0.2004 7.3284 
tGln  -5.1944 (2) -1.3840 0.2664 16.6579 
tOln  -6.2232 (2) -1.7631 0.2833 14.6421 
tFln  -20.9864 (2)** -3.2372 0.1542 4.3543 
tUln  -26.3738 (3)* -3.5757 0.1355 3.7807 
tIln  -32.0787 (1)* -3.9911 0.1244 2.9184 
tSln  -24.6126 (2) * -3.5080 0.1425 3.7025 
tGln  -18.1536 (1) * -3.0127 0.1659 5.0199 
tOln  -31.1045 (2)* -3.9407 0.1266 2.9459 
          Note: * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. () denotes  
          the lag length of the variables. 
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Table-2: ZA Unit Root Test 
Variable 
India China  
T-Statistic Break Year T-Statistic Break Year 
tFln  -3.609 (2) 1989 -4.097 (1) 1984 
tUln  -2.605 (1) 2005 -4.128 (2) 2010 
tIln  -4.313 (2) 1992 -4.563 (3) 1992 
tSln  -3.728 (1) 1984 -3.526 (2) 1990 
tGln  -3.416 (1) 2005 -3.500 (1) 1987 
tOln  -3.525 (2) 1984 -3.585 (2) 1986 
tFln  -6.357 (2)* 1998 -6.221 (2) * 1987 
tUln  -5.725 (4)* 1981 -6.021 (1) * 2001 
tIln  -7.184 (3)* 1978 -5.747 (3) * 1992 
tSln  -6.998 (2)* 2004 -7.009 (2) * 1992 
tGln  -5.724 (3)* 1981 -5.925 (3) * 1989 
tOln  -7.688 (3)* 2004 -7.277 (2) * 1991 
Note: * represents significance at the 1% level. 
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Table-3: The Results of ARDL Cointegration Test  
Bounds Testing Approach to Cointegration Diagnostic tests 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Models  Lag length Break Year F-statistics 2NORMAL  
2
ARCH  
2
RESET  
2
SERIAL  
India 
),,,,( tttttt OGSIUfF   2, 1, 2, 2, 2 1989 7.511** 1.2368 [1]: 0.6508 [1]: 2.4869 [1]: 0.5943 
),,,,( tttttt OGSIFfU   2, 2, 2, 1, 2 2005 6.818** 0.0871 [2]: 2.6465 [1]: 0.0159 [2]: 1.4781 
),,,,( tttttt OGSUFfI   2, 1, 2, 2, 1 1992 7.637** 0.4832 [1]: 0.0023 [2]: 1.6432 [1]: 1.4690 
),,,,( tttttt OGIUFfS   2, 2, 2, 2, 1 1984 8.905* 1.4089 [1]: 2.3341 [2]: 2.9027 [1]: 2.8835 
),,,,( tttttt OSIUFfG   2, 1, 2, 2, 1 2005 4.427 0.6269 [1]: 0.1663 [1]: 0.0122 [1]: 3.2245 
),,,,( tttttt OGSIUfO   2, 2, 2, 2, 1 1984 2.819 1.5052 [1]: 3.8692 [1]: 0.0168 [1]: 3.4223 
China 
),,,,( tttttt OGSIUfF   2, 2, 2, 1, 2 1984 6.934** 0.2755 [1]: 1.4555 [1]: 1.1924 [3]: 2.0813 
),,,,( tttttt OGSIFfU   2, 2, 1, 2, 2 2010 1.928 0.7868 [2]: 2.4373 [3]: 2.2084 [3]: 3.1209 
),,,,( tttttt OGSUFfI   2, 2, 2, 2, 2 1992 6.022 2.2508 [1]: 3.2030 1]: 0.0019 [1]: 2.9695 
),,,,( tttttt OGIUFfS   2, 1, 1, 1, 2 1990 11.666* 1.4899 [1]: 1.6082 [1]: 0.0004 [3]: 2.9719 
),,,,( tttttt OSIUFfG   2, 2, 2, 1, 1 1987 6.871** 0.8971 [1]: 1.5799 [1]: 2.0732 [2]: 2.1977 
),,,,( tttttt OGSIUfO   2, 2, 1, 1, 1 1986 11.751* 0.3908 [1]: 0.0009 [2]: 0.1816 [1]: 1.0366 
Level of Significance  
Critical values#      
Lower 
bounds I(0) 
Upper 
bounds I(1) 
     
1% 7.317 8.720      
5% 5.360  6.373      
10% 4.437  5.377      
Note: The asterisks * and ** denote significance at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. The optimal lag length is 
determined by AIC. [ ] is the order of diagnostic tests. # Critical values are collected from Narayan (2005). 
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Table-4: Long Run Analysis 
Dependent variable = tFln  
India 
Variable  OLS FMOLS DOLS CCR 
Constant  -8.7591* -9.1835* -11.8133* -9.0662* 
tUln  3.5227* 3.7146* 4.5281* 3.5897** 
tIln  0.8380*** 0.9353*** 0.3975** 1.0059** 
tSln  -0.3736* -0.4953* -0.4576** -0.4862* 
tGln  -0.7673** -0.9171* -0.2246* -0.8966* 
tOln  0.3420*** 0.3416* 0.1849** 0.3124** 
R2 0.9745 0.9861 0.9976 0.9862 
China 
Variables  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant  -4.0910* -4.0717* -4.1949* -3.7678* 
tUln  3.1839* 3.5272* 2.0990* 3.3737* 
tIln  0.6540* 0.6743* 0.5057** 0.70816* 
tSln  -0.6489** -0.9622** -0.5278** -0.9695* 
tGln  -0.0604* -0.0359** -0.0860* -0.0138* 
tOln  -0.3700* -0.4794** -0.0865* -0.5098* 
2R  0.9973 0.9967 0.9953 0.9965 
       Note: * and ** show significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table-5: Short Run Analysis  
Dependent Variable = tFln  
Variables  India  China 
Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic 
Constant  -0.0692*** -1.9009 0.2411** 2.6248 
tUln  8.6787* 2.9619 -3.2434 -1.3429 
tIln  0.6616** 2.4977 0.3194** 2.0282 
tSln  -0.0070 0.1420 -0.3309** -2.0160 
tGln  0.2911 1.2568 -0.5546* -3.0445 
tOln  0.1079 0.9964 -0.0060 -0.0524 
1tECM  -0.3907* -4.6072 -0.6783* -5.1927 
2R  0.5058  0.5478  
F-statistic 5.4601*  5.4514*  
D. W 1.8808  1.6772  
Short Run Diagnostic Tests 
Test  F-statistic Prob. value F-statistic Prob. value 
NORMAL2  1.2777 0.5278 0.2026 0.9036 
SERIAL2  0.7959 0.4605 1.6827 0.2062 
ARCH2  0.4997 0.4841 2.7552 0.1702 
WHITE2  1.0201 0.4301 0.3645 0.7003 
REMSAY2  1.2599 0.2703 0.1339 0.7173 
CUSUM Stable   Stable   
CUSUMsq Stable   Stable   
Note: * and ** show significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table-6: The VECM Granger Causality Analysis for India and China 
Dependent  
Variable 
 Direction of Causality11 
Short Run Long Run 
1ln  tF  1ln  tU  1ln  tI  1ln  tS  1ln  tG  1ln  tO  1tECT  
India 
1ln  tF  ….
 3.9603** 
[0.0308] 
1.0817 
[0.3532] 
0.6357 
[0.5373] 
0.2588 
[0.7728] 
0.3229 
[0.6855] 
-0.4071* 
[-4.0329] 
1ln  tU  
1.7472 
[0.1941] 
…. 
1.0348 
[0.3695] 
3.2554** 
[0.0547] 
1.3222 
[0.2839] 
0.1357 
[0.8737] 
-0.0280* 
[-2.8855] 
1ln  tI  
0.6362 
[0.5373] 
0.7589 
[0.4787] 
…. 
2.5761*** 
[0.0953] 
0.5867 
[0.5633] 
4.2520** 
[0.0253] 
-0.4125** 
[-2.5261] 
1ln  tS  
0.0034 
[0.9966] 
0.1258 
[0.8823] 
0.4130 
[0.6659] 
…. 
1.3006 
[0.2692] 
0.0655 
[0.9367] 
-0.7253* 
[-2.8353] 
1ln  tG  
1.8661 
[0.1741] 
1.4853 
[0.2415] 
0.1032 
[0.9022] 
1.8585 
[0.1753] 
…. 
0.2753 
[0.7614] 
…. 
1ln  tO  
0.3554 
[0.6838] 
0.2014 
[0.8188] 
1.6556 
[0.2098] 
1.0324 
[0.3698] 
0.1934 
[0.8253] 
…. …. 
China 
 1ln  tF  1ln  tU  1ln  tI  1ln  tS  1ln  tG  1ln  tO  1tECT  
1ln  tF  … 
0.0431 
[0.9579] 
2.3259 
[0.1319] 
14.8855* 
[0.0000] 
13.0747* 
[0.0000] 
10.1233* 
[0.0016] 
-0.1083* 
[-7.4538] 
1ln  tU  
0.1741 
[0.8417] 
… 
1.7488 
[0.2056] 
13.1691* 
[0.0004] 
3.8341** 
[0.0436] 
0.5680 
[0.5776] 
… 
1ln  tI  
3.5191*** 
[0.0588] 
0.5461 
[0.5903] 
… 
2.7497*** 
[0.0961] 
1.3018 
[0.3011] 
10.9672* 
[0.0012] 
-0.4385* 
[-3.7097] 
1ln  tS  
1.3396 
[0.2915] 
0.4779 
[0.6292] 
1.7672 
[0.2046] 
… 
0.3441 
[0.7143] 
2.6414*** 
[0.1040] 
-0.8388** 
[2.3665] 
1ln  tG  
1.4620 
[0.2630] 
4.3751** 
[0.0319] 
0.0631 
[0.9391] 
10.6832* 
[0.0013] 
… 
4.3070** 
[0.0333] 
-0.3037** 
[-2.9253]
 
1ln  tO  
1.5037 
[0.2540] 
10.9290* 
[0.0004] 
23.8285* 
[0.0000] 
24.1801* 
[0.0000] 
4.0536** 
[0.0391] 
… 
-0.6217* 
[-3.8828] 
Note: *, ** and *** show significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively; [] indicates the respective t-
statistic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
The results are similar once we used civil liberty (
tCln ) and political rights ( tPln ) as indicators of democracy for 
both countries. The results are available upon request from the authors. 
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Table-7: Variance Decomposition Analysis for India 
 Variance Decomposition of tFln  
 Period tFln  tUln  tIln  tSln  tGln  tOln  
 1  100.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 2  93.0506  2.0250  0.2554  0.0205  0.5009  4.1472 
 3  77.5708  5.6759  1.0655  1.1673  0.9186  13.6016 
 4  64.4554  9.0775  1.7854  2.7076  1.0909  20.8830 
 5  56.2321  11.8371  1.8407  2.7221  1.0635  26.3043 
 6  51.2166  13.9123  1.5272  2.2676  0.9311  30.1450 
 7  47.7765  15.4355  1.7146  1.9929  0.7965  32.2837 
 8  44.9119  16.5658  2.9472  1.8711  0.6834  33.0203 
 9  42.2467  17.4148  5.0804  1.8085  0.5925  32.8568 
 10  39.7696  18.0657  7.6439  1.7695  0.5212  32.2298 
 11  37.5466  18.5777  10.2532  1.7465  0.4635  31.4122 
 12  35.6064  18.9829  12.7217  1.7399  0.4144  30.5345 
 13  33.9374  19.2952  14.9970  1.7512  0.3720  29.6469 
 14  32.5095  19.5247  17.0820  1.7794  0.3357  28.7685 
 15  31.2881  19.6845  18.9901  1.8202  0.3056  27.9114 
 Variance Decomposition of tUln  
 Period tFln  tUln  tIln  tSln  tGln  tOln  
 1  3.0637  96.9362  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 2  9.6655  86.6899  0.8350  0.0921  0.1581  2.5590 
 3  16.9602  78.0963  1.0856  0.0638  0.0718  3.7219 
 4  24.2357  69.5911  0.7940  0.3599  0.2474  4.7716 
 5  30.8719  61.4211  0.5107  0.6756  0.6254  5.8950 
 6  36.0089  54.4072  0.6278  0.8176  0.9097  7.2285 
 7  39.3288  48.7531  1.2132  0.8369  0.9924  8.8753 
 8  41.0043  44.3277  2.1554  0.8073  0.9302  10.7747 
 9  41.4247  40.9222  3.3232  0.7708  0.8058  12.7530 
 10  41.0062  38.3142  4.6316  0.7472  0.6726  14.6278 
 11  40.0958  36.2960  6.0389  0.7454  0.5544  16.2692 
 12  38.9407  34.6972  7.5248  0.7677  0.4574  17.6119 
 13  37.6976  33.3928  9.0724  0.8117  0.3804  18.6449 
 14  36.4566  32.2988  10.6602  0.8720  0.3198  19.3923 
 15  35.2655  31.3615  12.2612  0.9428  0.2721  19.8966 
 Variance Decomposition of tIln  
 Period tFln  tUln  tIln  tSln  tGln  tOln  
 1  3.2065  9.9230  86.8704  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 2  20.7419  6.9799  61.9294  5.4952  0.0983  4.7550 
 3  26.9219  7.4174  52.6948  5.4742  0.1154  7.3760 
 4  27.3881  9.6981  48.6272  4.1479  0.0982  10.0403 
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 5  26.1932  12.3914  45.2801  3.3432  0.1674  12.6245 
 6  25.0122  14.6372  42.5811  2.8526  0.1938  14.7229 
 7  24.1836  16.1970  40.7334  2.6429  0.1736  16.0693 
 8  23.6257  17.1895  39.7057  2.6189  0.1563  16.7038 
 9  23.2203  17.8099  39.3034  2.6511  0.1486  16.8665 
 10  22.9018  18.2128  39.2669  2.6814  0.1427  16.7942 
 11  22.6424  18.5035  39.3839  2.6944  0.1363  16.6393 
 12  22.4257  18.7456  39.5313  2.6899  0.1298  16.4774 
 13  22.2404  18.9685  39.6578  2.6743  0.1242  16.3346 
 14  22.0809  19.1792  39.7518  2.6554  0.1198  16.2126 
 15  21.9454  19.3754  39.8187  2.6388  0.1168  16.1046 
 Variance Decomposition of tSln  
 Period tFln  tUln  tIln  tSln  tGln  tOln  
 1  0.1065  0.1845  4.5534  95.1554  0.0000  0.0000 
 2  0.1562  0.2065  15.3918  84.2407  0.0002  0.0044 
 3  0.1381  0.8989  23.8027  74.1565  0.5274  0.4761 
 4  0.3051  1.6558  26.4497  69.4007  1.3600  0.8283 
 5  0.4958  1.8881  26.9687  68.0901  1.5049  1.0521 
 6  0.6581  1.8723  26.8702  67.5724  1.5200  1.5067 
 7  0.8696  1.9625  26.4860  66.6234  1.6822  2.3760 
 8  1.1292  2.2255  25.9898  65.3549  1.8426  3.4577 
 9  1.3794  2.5898  25.5326  64.0972  1.9333  4.4673 
 10  1.6007  2.9680  25.1951  62.9878  1.9650  5.2830 
 11  1.8078  3.3032  25.0093  62.0205  1.9609  5.8980 
 12  2.0131  3.5780  24.9831  61.1410  1.9403  6.3441 
 13  2.2148  3.8005  25.1055  60.3024  1.9144  6.6621 
 14  2.4027  3.9863  25.3445  59.4880  1.8877  6.8905 
 15  2.5676  4.1479  25.6555  58.7078  1.8620  7.0589 
 Variance Decomposition of tGln  
 Period tFln  tUln  tIln  tSln  tGln  tOln  
 1  4.64566  7.0406  0.2922  7.5466  80.4746  0.0000 
 2  9.61974  10.9278  0.2996  6.2937  71.3015  1.5574 
 3  11.1976  11.8592  1.7900  5.2649  68.2928  1.5951 
 4  12.8023  10.9738  5.2743  4.9644  63.9007  2.0843 
 5  14.0433  10.7785  8.8797  4.4861  57.3599  4.4522 
 6  14.4573  12.4755  10.9975  3.9114  50.3993  7.75879 
 7  14.5074  15.1678  11.8616  3.4069  44.2312  10.8248 
 8  14.6877  17.7340  12.3005  3.0611  39.1863  13.0303 
 9  15.1459  19.6725  12.8351  2.8924  35.1161  14.3376 
 10  15.8383  20.9272  13.6670  2.8517  31.7401  14.9754 
 11  16.6597  21.6395  14.7988  2.8631  28.8295  15.2091 
 12  17.4995  22.0058  16.1126  2.8682  26.2596  15.2541 
 13  18.2713  22.1973  17.4544  2.8430  23.9797  15.2541 
 14  18.9270  22.3257  18.7066  2.7906  21.9669  15.2829 
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 15  19.4556  22.4446  19.8167  2.7247  20.1982  15.3600 
 Variance Decomposition of tOln  
 Period tFln  tUln  tIln  tSln  tGln  tOln  
 1  1.3538  7.8212  11.2688  1.5049  0.6986  77.3524 
 2  11.7119  10.7532  15.2436  0.6865  0.6827  60.9219 
 3  13.3719  14.8242  18.4688  0.6079  1.2491  51.4778 
 4  13.3098  17.8326  20.5847  0.8080  1.4681  45.9965 
 5  13.4914  19.6895  22.4420  1.0201  1.3580  41.9988 
 6  13.7969  20.7286  24.3663  1.2431  1.1682  38.6967 
 7  14.1273  21.1777  26.3464  1.4805  0.9977  35.8702 
 8  14.4559  21.2523  28.2917  1.7003  0.8697  33.4299 
 9  14.7511  21.1427  30.1036  1.8747  0.7777  31.3499 
 10  14.9937  20.9794  31.7055  1.9981  0.7093  29.6137 
 11  15.1834  20.8319  33.0611  2.0803  0.6559  28.1871 
 12  15.3305  20.7266  34.1740  2.1355  0.6131  27.0202 
 13  15.4480  20.6653  35.0736  2.1752  0.5782  26.0594 
 14  15.5484  20.6396  35.7985  2.2068  0.5498  25.2565 
 15  15.6415  20.6389  36.3851  2.2343  0.5266  24.5732 
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Table-8: Variance Decomposition Analysis for China 
 Variance Decomposition of tFln  
 Period tFln  tUln  tIln  tSln  tGln  tOln  
 1  100.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 2  97.6330  0.3515  0.0618  1.2495  0.6649  0.0390 
 3  93.8862  1.8566  0.3574  1.1919  0.7789  1.9287 
 4  85.0543  4.2109  1.1243  2.2684  0.9554  6.3865 
 5  80.9285  5.3093  1.4035  3.4071  1.1552  7.7961 
 6  80.2755  5.3534  1.3988  3.7046  1.2630  8.0044 
 7  80.0239  5.4784  1.4162  3.7995  1.2690  8.0127 
 8  79.2222  6.2553  1.4311  3.9022  1.2560  7.9330 
 9  77.6203  7.9863  1.4147  3.9814  1.2287  7.7684 
 10  75.2378  10.7512  1.3761  3.9317  1.1852  7.5176 
 11  72.5052  14.0821  1.3281  3.7786  1.1362  7.1694 
 12  70.0134  17.2660  1.2829  3.5787  1.0962  6.7626 
 13  68.1437  19.8514  1.2466  3.3585  1.0645  6.335 
 14  66.9567  21.7382  1.2153  3.1374  1.0346  5.9174 
 15  66.2862  23.0491  1.1793  2.9386  1.0047  5.5417 
 Variance Decomposition of tUln  
 Period tFln  tUln  tIln  tSln  tGln  tOln  
 1  3.28927  96.7107  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 2  4.1902  91.2633  0.2024  0.7700  0.0278  3.5460 
 3  7.6376  88.2449  0.3219  0.2972  0.0141  3.4840 
 4  10.9135  85.7274  0.4708  0.1631  0.0803  2.6446 
 5  14.9302  82.3515  0.5720  0.1050  0.1776  1.8636 
 6  19.7804  77.8224  0.6656  0.0742  0.2562  1.4008 
 7  24.9102  72.8645  0.7384  0.0562  0.3040  1.1264 
 8  29.4177  68.5039  0.7630  0.0451  0.3320  0.9380 
 9  32.9366  65.1398  0.7396  0.0443  0.3449  0.7944 
 10  35.6109  62.5912  0.6940  0.0616  0.3473  0.6947 
 11  37.7498  60.5319  0.6472  0.0912  0.3458  0.6338 
 12  39.6013  58.7235  0.6069  0.1232  0.3455  0.5993 
 13  41.2944  57.0512  0.5738  0.1537  0.3477  0.5788 
 14  42.8610  55.4955  0.5459  0.1827  0.3514  0.5631 
 15  44.2813  54.0829  0.5212  0.2107  0.3549  0.5487 
 Variance Decomposition of tIln  
 Period tFln  tUln  tIln  tSln  tGln  tOln  
 1  0.2602  9.4745  90.2651  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 2  6.9101  7.3235  75.3002  7.2898  3.1758  0.0004 
 3  4.9449  7.1472  55.4363  30.1874  2.2822  0.0017 
 4  5.9561  12.3178  39.4690  39.5510  2.3113  0.3945 
 5  7.3046  23.7843  30.5165  35.9061  2.1544  0.3337 
 6  6.0154  34.4081  25.0314  31.0836  1.7500  1.7113 
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 7  9.3275  39.4249  20.6308  26.1338  1.8051  2.6776 
 8  23.9053  36.5012  15.9457  19.6786  1.9042  2.0647 
 9  38.9597  30.9079  12.1982  14.4720  1.7942  1.6677 
 10  47.5356  27.5767  10.029  11.7042  1.6420  1.5118 
 11  51.2949  26.3626  8.9681  10.486  1.5268  1.3609 
 12  52.7133  26.0374  8.4876  9.9745  1.4514  1.3355 
 13  53.4277  25.8793  8.1864  9.6557  1.4004  1.4502 
 14  54.2833  25.5856  7.8768  9.3213  1.3658  1.5670 
 15  55.5110  25.0701  7.5443  8.9405  1.3436  1.5902 
 Variance Decomposition of tSln  
 Period tFln  tUln  tIln  tSln  tGln  tOln  
 1  1.0713  0.1435  0.2293  98.5557  0.0000  0.0000 
 2  3.6544  0.1381  2.7521  83.1941  4.2506  6.0104 
 3  5.8012  0.1526  2.7877  75.6779  3.4793  12.1011 
 4  5.0046  1.5254  2.5429  66.5206  3.0995  21.3068 
 5  11.3038  3.8133  2.1885  59.0916  3.0481  20.5544 
 6  24.5428  4.8313  1.9146  48.9851  2.7487  16.9773 
 7  32.8515  5.3472  1.6795  42.7329  2.5399  14.8488 
 8  35.2371  6.1199  1.7145  40.4552  2.4357  14.0373 
 9  35.1154  6.9699  2.0723  39.5761  2.3666  13.8994 
 10  34.7449  7.6600  2.3703  38.9335  2.3190  13.9721 
 11  34.7629  8.1967  2.4461  38.3162  2.2928  13.9850 
 12  35.2417  8.6365  2.4143  37.6054  2.2850  13.8168 
 13  35.8926  9.0182  2.3683  36.8859  2.2741  13.5606 
 14  36.3028  9.3594  2.3380  36.3728  2.2552  13.3716 
 15  36.3646  9.6568  2.3406  36.1188  2.2406  13.2783 
 Variance Decomposition of tGln  
 Period tFln  tUln  tIln  tSln  tGln  tOln  
 1  76.5801  0.3328  0.1094  4.4061  18.571  0.0000 
 2  87.1292  0.2032  0.4697  2.1926  9.6597  0.3453 
 3  90.6193  0.1850  0.3081  1.3477  6.5647  0.9748 
 4  91.8510  0.3494  0.2529  1.5376  5.1734  0.8355 
 5  91.3270  1.4137  0.3251  1.4771  4.7009  0.7559 
 6  89.0636  3.7744  0.5166  1.3530  4.3658  0.9264 
 7  86.0554  6.8715  0.6814  1.2694  4.0955  1.0265 
 8  82.8465  10.1672  0.7888  1.2226  3.8888  1.0859 
 9  79.5918  13.4766  0.8740  1.1795  3.7244  1.1534 
 10  76.5729  16.5474  0.9534  1.1350  3.5837  1.2074 
 11  74.1114  19.0878  1.0181  1.0962  3.4656  1.2206 
 12  72.3048  20.9954  1.0606  1.0628  3.3683  1.2078 
 13  71.0594  22.3509  1.0828  1.0346  3.2858  1.1862 
 14  70.2324  23.2890  1.0899  1.0114  3.2151  1.1619 
 15  69.6967  23.9280  1.0867  0.9939  3.1560  1.1384 
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 Variance Decomposition of tOln  
 Period tFln  tUln  tIln  tSln  tGln  tOln  
 1  5.1562  17.5708  14.2105  21.0391  0.0473  41.9758 
 2  2.8029  30.2811  14.5553  15.3470  1.3555  35.6578 
 3  2.7822  40.6358  12.182  12.0909  1.2010  31.1075 
 4  3.8971  48.3236  9.8071  9.8943  1.0042  27.0733 
 5  3.7204  55.5218  8.1995  8.2907  0.8733  23.3941 
 6  3.3238  60.4349  7.3182  7.4630  0.7924  20.6675 
 7  4.4743  62.0097  6.9200  6.9212  0.8363  18.8382 
 8  7.9543  60.7269  6.6946  6.4351  0.8724  17.3163 
 9  11.9477  58.5155  6.4612  6.0275  0.8579  16.1899 
 10  14.3621  57.2569  6.2485  5.7664  0.8317  15.5342 
 11  15.2103  56.9603  6.1254  5.6625  0.8155  15.2257 
 12  15.4185  56.9189  6.0732  5.6567  0.8082  15.1241 
 13  15.5541  56.8603  6.0317  5.6579  0.8021  15.0936 
 14  15.8687  56.6978  5.9806  5.6294  0.7967  15.0264 
 15  16.4497  56.3685  5.9246  5.5766  0.7946  14.8858 
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Figure-1: CUSUM for India  
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Figure-2: CUSUMsq for India  
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Figure-3: CUSUM for China 
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Figure-4: CUSUMsq for China 
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